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ABSTRACT
Economic theory predicts that increasing the severity of punishments will deter criminal behavior
by raising the expected price of committing crime. This implicit price can be substantially raised by
making prison sentences longer, but only if offenders’ discount rates are relatively low. We use a
large sample of felony arrests to measure the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions. We exploit the
fact that young offenders are legally treated as adults——and face longer lengths of
incarceration——the day they turn 18. Sufficiently patient individuals should therefore significantly
lower their offending rates immediately upon turning 18. The small behavioral responses that we
estimate suggest that potential offenders are extremely impatient, myopic, or both.
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Crime continues to be an important social and economic issue in the United States. While
crime rates have fallen in the recent past, the cost of controlling crime has not. From 1970 to 1999,
criminal justice system expenditures as a share of national income increased 170 percent, and the
ratio of criminal justice employees to the population grew 115 percent. Over the same period, the
fraction of the population that is incarcerated increased 395 percent, making the U.S. incarceration
rate the highest in the world (Maguire and Pastore 2000, Chaddock 2003).
Crime also continues to be an active area of economic research. Recent studies have investigated
a wide range of potential factors, including the eﬀect of police and incarceration (Levitt 1997,
Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004, Levitt 1996, Levitt 1998), conditions in prisons (Katz, Levitt
and Shustorovich 2003), education (Lochner and Moretti 2004), social interactions and peer eﬀects
(Case and Katz 1991, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996, Gaviria and Raphael 2001, Kling,
Ludwig and Katz 2005, Jacob and Lefgren 2003), and family circumstances and structure (Glaeser
and Sacerdote 1999, Donohue and Levitt 2001). Economists have also considered the returns
to education among recent prison releasees (Western, Kling and Weiman 2001), the impact of
criminal histories on labor market outcomes (Grogger 1995, Kling 2004), the impact of wages and
unemployment rates on crime (Grogger 1998, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001), and the eﬀect of
incarceration on the supply of crime in the economy (Freeman 1996, 1999).
Much of this research is grounded in Becker’s (1968) framework, in which criminal behavior
is considered the outcome of a simple cost-beneﬁt calculation. Arguably, the core message of the
economic model of criminal behavior is that it can be discouragedby raising its expected “price”. As
a practical matter, for serious oﬀenses such as murder, robbery, or burglary, increases in expected
price may be achieved either through increases in the likelihood of punishment, or increases in the
length of prison sentences.
In addition, the ability to raise the price of crime crucially depends on how much potential
oﬀenders discount their future welfare. On the one hand, if potential oﬀenders value their future
as much as their present welfare, an increase in sentence lengths from 3 to 6 years, for example,
would double the expected price. The same eﬀect could be achieved by holding sentence lengths
ﬁxed and doubling the probability of punishment. That is, with patient oﬀenders, certainty and
1severity are substitutes (Becker 1968).
On the other hand, the population at risk of committing crime is generally thought to have very
high discount rates (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, Katz et al. 2003). If potential oﬀenders value
their future signiﬁcantly less than their present welfare, then the same increase in sentence lengths
from 3 to 6 years will have a much more modest impact than it would if they were patient. Indeed,
in the extreme case of inﬁnite discount rates, increasing sentence lengths would have no eﬀect, and
increasing the likelihood of punishment would be the only way to deter crime.
This paper measures the deterrence eﬀect of incarceration length on criminal behavior. As the
empirical literature has emphasized, there are two key diﬃculties in measuring this magnitude.
First, criminal sanctions may be endogenously determined. For example, high crime rates may
induce state and local governments to make criminal sanctions more punitive (Ehrlich 1973, Levitt
1997, Levitt 2004a). Second, even ignoring any potential endogeneity, the large estimates of the
impact of more punitive sanctions generated from cross-regional variation have an ambiguous in-
terpretation (Levitt 1996, Kessler and Levitt 1999). One interpretation is that sanctions are signiﬁ-
cantly discouraging criminal behavior by making it less attractive—a true deterrence or price eﬀect.
The alternative interpretation is that more punitive criminal sanctions reduce crime mechanically,
by removing highly crime-prone individuals from the community—the incapacitation eﬀect. This
latter explanation has nothing to do with behavioral responses to incentives.
To address these problems, this paper uses (1) a large, person-level, longitudinal data set on
arrests with information on exact date of birth and exact date of oﬀense, and (2) a quasi-experiment
generated by criminal law. Speciﬁcally, we take advantage of the following fact: when an individual
is charged with a crime that occurs before his 18th birthday, his case is handled by the juvenile
courts.1 But if the oﬀense is committed on or after his 18th birthday, his case must be handled by
the adult criminal court, which is known to administer more punitive criminal sanctions.2 Thus,
when a minor turns 18, there is an immediate increase in the expected price of crime.
We argue that even if all other determinants of criminal oﬀending change rapidly by age, they
do not change discontinuously at 18. This allows us to attribute any discontinuous drop in oﬀense
1While in principle the case may then be transferred to the adult criminal court, this is rare generally (Snyder
and Sickmund 1999). We examine juvenile transfer empirically in Section IV.
2In Florida, as in most states, the (criminal) age of majority is 18. Several other states have legislated age cutoﬀs
at 16 or 17 (Bozynski and Szymanski 2003).
2rates at 18 to a behavioral response to more punitive sanctions. Our approach circumvents the
endogeneity of a community’s response to crime since it does not use any cross-regional variation in
criminal sanctions. Equally important, our high-frequency, longitudinal data permit us to isolate
a pure deterrence eﬀect, rather than a combination of deterrence and incapacitation eﬀects.
Our theoretical and empirical results are as follows. First, we use a standard economic model of
crime to provide quantitative predictions of the deterrence eﬀect. Assuming exponential discounting
with a 0.95 discount factor, the theory predicts at least a 55 percent decline in the odds of arrest in
response to a tripling of incarceration lengths when the minor turns 18. The theory also predicts
that the proportional response to a marginal increase in incarceration lengths should be larger in
the near future (e.g., 3 versus 9 weeks) than in the distant future (e.g., 3 versus 9 years).
Second, using data on the universe of felony arrests in Florida from 1995-2002, we document the
following important fact: there is no signiﬁcant drop in oﬀending at age 18. The point estimates
are small in magnitude, with standard errors small relative to predicted eﬀect sizes; even our most
negative eﬀects are consistent with annualized discount factors less than 0.1. The estimates are
consistently small across types of crime and characteristics of the individual or jurisdiction.
The estimates are signiﬁcantly smaller than those found by existing studies that have examined
the reduced-form impact of more punitive sanctions on crime (for a summary, see Levitt 2004b). A
plausible explanation for these diﬀerences is that estimates in the existing literature are operating
mostly, and perhaps entirely, through an incapacitation eﬀect. In particular, if incapacitation begins
immediately—e.g., due to an initial detention upon arrest—then almost all analyses examining
crime rates at annual aggregates will estimate a combination of deterrence and incapacitation
eﬀects, rather than deterrence alone.3 We provide evidence consistent with this view, ﬁnding large
incapacitation eﬀects that are apparent even within a few weeks of an arrest.
We consider three potential explanations for our results. First, it is possible that potential of-
fenders either have systematically incorrect information about punishments, or behave irrationally.
Our economic model, calibration exercise, and supporting empirical evidence tell us that individuals
with reasonable discount factors should reduce their criminal propensities upon turning 18. But,
as a matter of fact, they may be making systematic errors in under-estimating the likelihoods and
severity of punishments, either at a given point in time, or in the transition from juvenile status to
3A notable exception is the approach of Kessler and Levitt (1999).
3adulthood.
Second, it is possible that oﬀenders are behaving rationally, but have extremely low discount
factors, perhaps much smaller than 0.1. Taken literally, this would imply that criminals perceive
the diﬀerence between prison sentences of 2 years and 20 years as negligible.
We consider this implication to be somewhat unlikely, and thus tend to favor a third interpreta-
tion: oﬀenders have hyperbolic time preferences, with very low short-run discount factors but more
reasonable long-run discount factors. Such a theory of present-biased preferences would imply that
criminals view the price diﬀerence between 2 and 6 weeks of incarceration to be small, but the price
diﬀerence between 2 and 6 years to be large. This kind of myopia could explain why we observe
such small eﬀects: most incarceration lengths are in fact short, so the sub-population of oﬀenders
threatened by long prison sentences may be too small to measurably aﬀect the overall estimates of
deterrence.
We conclude that, for any of the above interpretations, increases in incarceration lengths—from
current levels—are unlikely to signiﬁcantly deter criminal behavior. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows. Section II outlines our conceptual framework and identiﬁcation strategy.
Section III describes the data. We report our results in Section IV. Section V discusses alternative
interpretations, Section VI discusses policy implications, and Section VII concludes.
II. Conceptual Framework
We begin this section by reviewing the standard economic model of crime, embedding it in a
stochastic life-cycle framework.4 We use the model for two main purposes. First, we clarify the
identifying assumptions of our empirical strategy. Essentially, we are assuming that all determinants
of criminal behavior are evolving “smoothly” as the potential oﬀender turns 18—except for the
severity of criminal sanctions, which rises immediately upon the 18th birthday.
Second, after imposing some additional structure, we generate quantitative predictions for the
drop in oﬀense rates at age 18. Speciﬁcally, we suppose that oﬀenders (1) are rational, (2) have
accurate information about punishments, and (3) have exponential time preferences and annual
discount factors of 0.95. The theory predicts at least a 55 percent decline in the odds of arrest at
18, in response to a three-fold increase in the length of incarceration, for an elasticity of -0.28.5 We
4We discuss the highlights of the model here and provide details in Appendix A.
5This is in the middle of the range of estimates from the empirical literature (Levitt 2004b).
4illustrate how these predictions change with diﬀerent discount factors and time horizons.
After presenting our empirical results, we return in Section V to the model, extending it to
allow for hyperbolic discounting and contrasting the predictions from the two approaches.
II.A. The Economic Model of Criminal Behavior
Consider a dynamic version of the model given in Becker (1968). Throughout his (inﬁnite-
period) lifetime, the individual chooses whether or not to commit a crime in each period t during
which he is free. If he chooses to commit a crime, with probability pt he will be apprehended
and punished, leading to the payoﬀ Us
t , the lifetime utility properly discounted to period t. With
probability 1 ¡ pt, the oﬀense is undetected, and he obtains lifetime utility Ucr
t . If he chooses not
to commit the crime in period t, he receives lifetime utility Ua
t . Thus, at each point in time t, the
individual commits crime if and only if
ptUs
t + (1 ¡ pt)Ucr
t > Ua
t
where we assume Us
t < Ua
t < Ucr
t . Equivalently, he will commit crime if and only if the probability









For any given pt, as the rewards to crime rise (an increase in Ucr
t ), the payoﬀ to legal activity
falls (a decrease in Ua
t ), or the criminal sanctions become less punitive (an increase in Us
t ), the
individual is more likely to commit an oﬀense, because it is more likely that pt will fall below the
reservation probability pt.
To allow for a stochastic element to the model, suppose that in each period t, the individual
receives a random draw from a distribution of criminal opportunities. Each opportunity is more
or less attractive as pt is low or high. For example, the least valuable opportunity is one for
which apprehension is assured, (i.e., one for which pt = 1). Letting Ft(¢) denote the cumulative
distribution function of pt, the probability that the individual commits a crime in period t is thus
Pr(Crime in t) = Ft(pt)
5II.B. Identiﬁcation Strategy
Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the fact that in the United States, the severity of criminal
sanctions depends discontinuously on the age of the oﬀender at the time of the oﬀense. In all 50 U.S.
states, oﬀenders younger than a certain age, typically 18, are subject to punishments determined
by the juvenile courts. The day the oﬀender turns 18, however, he is subject to the more punitive
adult criminal courts. The criminal courts are known to be more punitive in a number of diﬀerent
ways. For example, as we document below, the expected length of incarceration is signiﬁcantly
longer when the oﬀender is treated as an adult rather than as a juvenile.
We follow a cohort of youth longitudinally and examine whether there is a discontinuous drop
in their oﬀense rates when they turn 18. Our data contain exact date of birth and exact date
of oﬀense, allowing us to examine the timing at high frequencies. A high frequency approach is
important, because it allows us diﬀerentiate between secular age eﬀects (Grogger 1998, Levitt and
Lochner 2001) and a response to the increase in the price of crime.
Illustrating our approach, Figure I plots criminal propensities at each point in time, under
two hypothetical scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, represented by the solid line, the individual is
patient and possesses a low discount rate (high discount factor). The probability of oﬀense drops
discontinuously at the age of 18, because at that age the expected cost of crime jumps signiﬁcantly,
leading crime to be less attractive.6
In the second scenario, the individual is impatient and possesses a high discount rate. Here,
even facing the same increase in incarceration lengths as above, the individual perceives the jump
in the price of crime to be much more modest. As a result, the drop in criminal propensity is
not as great. Our empirical analysis amounts to determining whether the data are relatively more
consistent with the ﬁrst or second scenario.
Our approach does not require that the determinants of criminal behavior be constant through-
out the individual’s life. Instead, it relies on the arguably plausible assumption that determinants
of criminal propensity—other than the severity of punishments—do not change discontinuously
at 18. For example, we are arguing that on average, wages do not “jump up” the day after an
6Note that we are estimating what is known in the criminology literature as “general deterrence”, which is the
eﬀect of the threat of punishment on criminal behavior. General deterrence is the phenomenon traditionally addressed
in the economics of crime. By contrast, Pintoﬀ (2004) identiﬁes what is known in criminology as “speciﬁc deterrence”,
or the extent to which a prison experience will lower post-release criminal propensity.
6individual turns 18, and that the distribution of criminal opportunities does not systematically and
dramatically change between the day before and day after the 18th birthday. As another example,
we consider it plausible that the ability of law enforcement to apprehend an oﬀender does not
discontinuously change between the week before and the week after the agent’s 18th birthday.
We emphasize that we only believe that “all other factors” are roughly constant when examining
oﬀense rates in relatively short intervals (e.g., one day, or one week). By contrast, we consider it
likely that all determinants of criminal behavior are changing signiﬁcantly from year to year. In
the age range of 17, 18, or 19, for example, youth could be graduating from high school, starting
a new job, or developing physiologically and psychologically in ways that could aﬀect underlying
criminal propensities.
Formally, let t0 be the week following the individual’s 18th birthday, and t be measured in week





t0¡1, and Ft0(¢) = Ft0¡1(¢): the lifetime utilities from the crime, from
the legitimate activity, and the distribution of available criminal opportunities are approximately
the same for the two periods. The only diﬀerence between periods t0 ¡1 and t0, we are arguing, is
that lifetime utility will be diﬀerent if apprehended: Us
t0 6= Us
t0¡1.
This key smoothness assumption implies that














Thus, we obtain the unambiguous prediction that the discontinuous jump in the punitiveness of
sanctions at age 18 will lead to a corresponding discontinuous drop in the probability of oﬀending.
II.C. Estimation
We implement our identiﬁcation strategy by providing an empirical analogue to the proﬁle
depicted in Figure I. We follow a ﬁxed cohort of individuals and estimate the probability of oﬀending





1 ¡ Ft (pt)
¶
= X0
t® + Dtµ (2)
7where Xt ´
¡
1;t ¡ t0;(t ¡ t0)2;:::;(t ¡ t0)q¢0, q is the order of the polynomial, t indexes age in
weeks, t0 is the week of the 18th birthday, and Dt is 1 if t ¸ t0, and is 0 otherwise.7 The reduced-
form parameter of interest is µ, the discontinuous change in the log-odds of committing an oﬀense
when the youth turns 18 and immediately becomes subject to the adult criminal courts.
The logit model is a simple way to parametrically describe the time proﬁle of criminal propensi-
ties. A completely non-parametric approach would proceed as follows. Let N be the total number
of individuals in our sample of 17 year-olds, and let n1 denote the number of individuals who com-
mit their ﬁrst post-17 oﬀense in the ﬁrst week, n2 the number who commit their ﬁrst oﬀense in





We present these nonparametric estimates graphically in our empirical analysis. In addition,
we use the logit in Equation (2) to ﬁt the nonparametric estimates to a parametric form and to
provide more eﬃcient estimates of the discontinuity at age 18.
Note that we utilize arrest information as a proxy for criminal oﬀending—as is common in the
crime literature—since error-free criminal oﬀending data does not exist. Thus, strictly speaking,
we cannot estimate Equation (2), which expresses the odds of oﬀending as a function of age.
Nevertheless, this does not pose a problem for our identiﬁcation strategy, since we have already
assumed that the distribution Ft(¢) is evolving smoothly and does not discontinuously change at
18. As discussed above, this means that the risk of apprehension for any ﬁxed criminal opportunity
does not change abruptly upon an individual’s 18th birthday. Thus, we henceforth re-deﬁne Ft(pt)
as the probability as of time t of being arrested for the ﬁrst time since turning 17, deﬁning Ft(pt) ´
F¤
t (pt)Ept, where F¤
t (¢) is the distribution of criminal opportunities, and Ept ´ Et[ptjpt < pt] is the
expected apprehension rate conditional on committing the crime. Since both F¤
t (¢) and Ept are
monotonically increasing in pt, the qualitative predictions are unchanged when using arrests.
II.D. Predicted Magnitudes
In this sub-section, we address the following question: How large should we expect µ to be
if individuals are forward-looking and have rational expectations? The answer to this question
7The vector Xt can also include interactions of the polynomial in t with the indicator Dt.
8This evolving “risk-set” is also used in estimation of the logit model. Thus, the data is an unbalanced panel,
where there are N observations for the ﬁrst period, N ¡ n1 for the second, N ¡ n2 for the third, and so on. Efron
(1988) points out that the logit model described estimates the hazard function.
8requires quantifying the diﬀerence between punishments in the juvenile and adult systems. Our
calibration exercise focuses on the diﬀerences in expected incarceration length. We discuss other
qualitative diﬀerences between the punitiveness of the two systems at the end of this sub-section.
Appendix B provides some simple estimates of the expected duration of incarceration, condi-
tional on an arrest. For Florida, the average incarceration length for juveniles arrested for Index
crimes range from 2.7 to 6.5 weeks. Adult incarceration lengths are 3.1 to 7.4 times as long.9 We
emphasize that these numbers are conditional on arrest, and will represent an average of long peri-
ods (for convicted felons) and very brief periods of incarceration (for those who are released shortly
after an arrest). Thus, we broadly deﬁne “incarceration” to be any period in which an arrestee is
in custody of the criminal justice system (e.g., awaiting trial).
Using these estimates in conjunction with age-speciﬁc arrest rates and assumptions on discount









1 ¡ Ft0(pt0¡1 (±;SJ;SA))
¶
(3)
where the notation emphasizes that pt0 and pt0¡1 are functions of the weekly discount factor ±,
incarceration length for juveniles, SJ, measured in weeks, and the incarceration length for adults,
SA. To make these quantitative predictions, we invoke the following assumptions:
A1. Linear Approximation of F¤
t0 (¢). Consider a ﬁrst-order approximation around pt0 = 0
(where F¤
t0 (0) = 0), so that we have F¤
t0(pt0) ¼ f ¢ pt0, with f a positive constant.10 With








A2. Stationarity. In each period, the ﬂow utilities from committing a crime undetected, from
the alternative legal activity, and from being caught, are ucr, ua, and us, respectively, for all
t ¸ t0¡1. Similarly, the distribution of criminal opportunities is the same over time: F¤
t (¢) =
F¤ (¢) for all t ¸ t0¡1. Furthermore, we assume that no matter how many incarceration spells
the oﬀender has experienced, he faces the same dynamic optimization problem whenever he
is released.
A3. Structure of Punishments. If apprehended, the individual must remain incarcerated
for SJ (if caught as a juvenile) or SA (if caught as an adult) periods. After this incarcer-
ation, the individual is released and faces the original decision problem. For each period
during the incarceration, he receives ﬂow utility us. This implies that an oﬀender who is
9Our estimates are in the the range of the case-control matching approach to sentencing diﬀerences found in the
criminological literature (for a review, see Redding 2003).
10Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000, Appendix 1) use a ﬁrst-order approximation in a similar context.
9apprehended as an adult and is incarcerated for SA periods evaluates his time in prison as
us
¡
1 + ± + ±2 + ¢¢¢ + ±SA¡1¢
= us + ±¡±SA
1¡± us.
As we explain below, with these simpliﬁcations, if we choose SJ = 2 (weeks), SA = 6, ± = 0:999





to be 0.0025, the predicted µ is ¡1:54, or about an 80 percent decline in the odds of
arrest at 18 in response to an increase in the length of incarceration from 2 to 6 weeks.
II.E. Construction of Prediction for µ
We use the numerical example discussed above to illustrate the construction of the predicted µ.
In order to compute the predicted µ, it is suﬃcient to solve for the following unknowns: f, ucr, ua,
and us. To solve for f, we ﬁrst use the relation Ept0¼ 1
2pt0 and our estimate of Ept0 = 0:1, which
implies pt0 = 0:2: The estimate of Ept0 is roughly based on FBI statistics on “clearance rates”—the
fraction of reported crimes that end in an arrest of a suspect. Appendix B provides further details






t0, and our own estimate of the




= 0:0025 yields f = 0:125.
As shown in Appendix A, assumptions A2 and A3 result in the expressions
pt0¡1 =
ucr ¡ ua
ucr ¡ us + ±¡±SJ




ucr ¡ us + ±¡±SA
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
(5)
where
(1 ¡ ±)V =





It can be shown that—as with all expected utility problems of this type—optimal choices are
invariant to aﬃne transformations of the ﬂow utilities. Thus, it is innocuous to normalize us = 1
and ua = 2, for example. After substituting (6) into (4) and (5), we obtain two equations with
two unknowns, ucr and pt0¡1. Using ± = 0:999, SJ = 2, and SA = 6, we obtain ucr ¼ 3:52, and
pt0¡1 ¼ 0:43. We then use Equation (3) to calculate µ ¼ ¡1:54.
11It is worth noting that these data may overstate the probability of arrest, since pressure to “clear” oﬀenses may
lead to inﬂated counts. This may cause our calibration to be too conservative regarding the magnitude of µ.
10II.F. Intuition Behind Prediction for µ
A more detailed discussion of the derivation of (4), (5), and (6) is provided in Appendix A. For
now, we simply note a number of intuitive features of these expressions. First, when ± = 0, pt0
and pt0¡1 collapse to (ucr ¡ ua)
±
(ucr ¡ us), the reservation probability from the static economic
model of crime (see, for example, Freeman 1999). This is intuitive since, for example, no criminal
opportunity will be worth doing when ucr = ua, leading to F(pt0) = F(pt0¡1) = 0.
Second, V is the expected discounted utility for the rest of an individual’s life at any point in
which he is free to commit a crime; (1 ¡ ±)V is its “annuitized” value. In this numerical example,
(1 ¡ ±)V ¼ 2:02; it is strictly higher than ua = 2, because there is an “option value” of being able
to engage in crime. The per-period cost of being incarcerated is (1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us. The total cost to
the apprehended individual is ucr ¡ us + ±¡±SA
1¡±
h
(1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us
i
. Note that V is the same at both
t0 ¡ 1 and t0, because in both periods, the individual will face the same (adult) problem in the
subsequent period.
Third, equation (6) shows that (1 ¡ ±)V is a weighted average of the three ﬂow utilities ucr,
us, and ua, with weights given by the “steady-state” probabilities of receiving those utilities in a
randomly chosen time period.
Finally, the intuition behind the calculation can be summarized as follows. First, estimates of
the probability of being apprehended Ept0allow us to approximate the reservation probability pt0.




give us an approximation of how
much the arrest probability changes with a change from pt0¡1 to pt0. The reservation probability
pt0 yields information on the relative payoﬀ of crime ucr. Intuitively, a large pt0 means that ucr¡ua
is large relative to ua ¡ us; a small pt0 implies just the opposite. Finally, with a value for ucr we
may calculate pt0¡1, and this allows us to calculate µ.
II.G. Sensitivity of Predictions
The use of exponential discounting leads to an important implication: increases in incarceration
lengths for short periods (e.g., 3 versus 9 weeks) will lead to a larger percentage response—that is,
a larger µ—than will increases at longer periods (e.g., 3 versus 9 years). We illustrate this in Figure
II. In the top panel of Figure II, we maintain pt0 = 0:2, but vary (SJ;SA) from (1;3) to (100;300)
11weeks. For each value of SJ, we consider what µ would be if SA were 3 times as long as SJ.12
The solid squares show the predicted µ, when ± = 0:999 (corresponding to an annual discount
factor of 0.95). The predicted µ begins close to -1.54 (consistent with an 80 percent decline in the
odds of arrest) and declines only slightly in magnitude as SJ and SA increase. That the predicted
magnitude should decline as SJ increases is intuitive. Periods in the near future are given roughly
equal weight, so that a tripling of incarceration lengths from 5 to 15 weeks will represent a roughly
three-fold increase in the cost. On the other hand, for an increase from 5 to 15 years, utility in the
additional 10 years is weighted much less than utility in the initial 5 years.
This principle is illustrated more dramatically by the solid circles, which performs the same
calibration, but setting ± = 0:987 (corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.50). Under this
scenario, an increase in incarceration from 100 to 300 weeks will lead to µ = ¡0:5, or a 40 percent
reduction in the odds of an arrest at 18. The calculation for an increase in incarceration from 5
to 15 years (not shown in the ﬁgure) yields µ = ¡0:05, or a 5 percent decline in the odds of arrest
at 18. The solid triangles present the analogous computations for ± = 0:957 (corresponding to an
annual discount factor of 0.1), which exhibits a similar, but more extreme proﬁle than the other
discount rates considered.
In the bottom panel of Figure II, we illustrate the same calculations for pt0 = 0:5, which is the
largest pt0 consistent with clearance rates, as described in Appendix B. Note that this value implies
that an individual will commit an oﬀense if he perceives the probability of being apprehended to be
0.5 or less. The three curves have a similar shape, but the predictions using pt0 = 0:5 are roughly
half as large in magnitude as those using pt0 = 0:2.
II.H. Other Factors Aﬀecting µ
The calculation of our predicted µ is based on a very parsimonious model, and clearly ignores a
few potentially important factors. First of all, the adult and juvenile justice systems diﬀer in ways
other than in the expected incarceration length. There is general agreement that the conditions
of incarceration are worse in adult than juvenile facilities (Myers 2003).13 One inmate quoted in
12Note that for each value of SJ, we re-calculated the predicted µ as described above, so there is a unique ucr (and
V ) associated with each SJ;SA pair.
13Arguably the qualitative aspect of conﬁnement most salient for a youthful oﬀender is sexual assault. A widely-
cited study estimates that juvenile oﬀenders held in adult prison were sexually assaulted at a rate ﬁve times that of
juvenile oﬀenders held in juvenile facilities (Forst, Fagan and Vivona 1989).
12Levitt (1988) observed that “[When] you are a boy, you can be put into a detention home. But you
can go to jail now [as an adult]. Jail ain’t no place to go.”14 Moreover, these qualitative diﬀerences
may be most important for youthful oﬀenders.15
Second, we also do not incorporate the other advantages of being apprehended as a juvenile
rather than as an adult. For example, it is generally easier to expunge or seal arrest or conviction
records if the oﬀense was committed as a juvenile rather than an adult. There may also be a labor
market penalty to having a criminal record (compared to a clean record).16
Third, our dynamic model of criminal behavior does not allow for a richer kind of intertemporal
decision making. That is, we are assuming that the distribution of opportunities is strictly exoge-
nous: stealing a car today does not aﬀect the opportunities for stealing a car next week. A richer
model would allow the individual to explicitly choose the optimal timing of a particular crime.
Although our simple model ignores these factors, we conjecture that most reasonable formal-
izations of these additional factors would work to produce a µ that is larger in magnitude, for the
same SJ, SA and ±. In addition, as we show in Appendix B, the ratio SA=SJ could be as high as 7.
In sum, we believe that our predictions for the magnitude of µ are probably somewhat conservative.
III. Data and Sample
Our analysis uses an administrative database maintained by the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE). Essentially, the data consist of all recorded felony arrests in the state of
Florida from 1989 to 2002. The database includes exact date of birth, gender, and race for each
person. For each arrest incident, there is information on the date of the oﬀense, date of arrest, the
county of arrest, the type of oﬀense, whether or not the individual was formally charged for the
incident, and whether or not the incident led to a conviction and prison term. Most importantly,
the data are longitudinal: each arrest incident is linked to a person-level identiﬁer. A more detailed
description of the database and its construction is provided in Appendix C.
Our data has two important advantages over typically available arrest data. First, the data are
14The quotation is from interview research conducted by Glassner, Ksander, Berg and Johnson (1983, p. 219,
brackets in original).
15The youngest inmates in an institution are typically targeted for sexual victimization (Robertson 1999, Saccenti
2000). The age pattern of victimization is relevant since the marginal adult oﬀender, if conﬁned, will be youngest
among his peer inmates, whereas the marginal juvenile oﬀender, if conﬁned in a juvenile facility, will be oldest among
his peer inmates.
16We suspect this eﬀect is minor in light of evidence given in Kling (2004).
13high-frequency, allowing us to pinpoint age at oﬀense in weeks rather than years. Second the data
are longitudinal. In our context, these aspects are necessary to distinguish between deterrence and
incapacitation eﬀects.
To illustrate the value of these aspects of our data, we brieﬂy illustrate the inference problems
that arise when using the more readily available, but coarser, cross-sectional data on arrests. Figure
III plots the frequency distribution of age (by year), for all arrestees and those arrested for index
crimes,17 as computed from the two most readily available, public-use data sources on arrests: the
National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).
The ﬁgure shows clear secular age eﬀects in arrest rates, with an apparent trend break around
18. This is consistent with a change in criminal behavior due to more severe punishments for adults
at 18. But it is also consistent with criminal behavior declining as youth ﬁnish high school and enter
the labor market (Grogger 1998, Lochner 2004). A third—and arguably simpler—interpretation of
the peak at 18 is that it is entirely due to an incapacitation eﬀect. Starting at 18, arrestees are
conﬁned for longer periods, and therefore are temporarily removed from the community, and thus
cannot commit crime. Fewer and fewer arrests at older ages will occur as oﬀenders are incapacitated,
leading to a mechanical trend break at 18.
By comparison, our approach guarantees that we isolate only a deterrence eﬀect. Speciﬁcally,
our main estimation sample consists of all persons who have been arrested prior to age 17. Starting
at the 17th birthday, we begin tracking this population over time, and for each subsequent day,
estimate the probability of being arrested. A discontinuous drop in this arrest rate between day
365 and 366 will be due to deterrence. This is because the population still at risk of experiencing
their ﬁrst-post-17 arrest will be virtually identical for days 365 and 366.
There are a number of advantages of our main estimation sample compared to the remainder
of youth who have not been arrested as of age 17.18 First, our sample will include individuals who
will more likely be aﬀected by the increase in sanctions. In particular, it seems likely that for this
group, there is a positive net beneﬁt to criminal activity. After all, an individual in our sample
17Index crimes are murder, robbery, aggravated assault, rape, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.
18The choice of an age 17 threshold in constructing our sample was based on two competing interests. A higher
threshold would have the advantage of raising the sample size, but it would give us a shorter period from which to
estimate the probability of arrest on the left side of the discontinuity threshold. In the extreme, if we had chosen
all those who had been arrested prior to age 17.99, there would be almost no data to estimate the left side of the
discontinuity. A lower threshold would yield more periods from which to estimate the left part of the function (as
shown in Figure I), but would result in a lower number of individuals present in the ﬁrst period.
14has already been arrested at least once by 17, suggesting that at least one crime was worthwhile
to the juvenile. By contrast, those who have not been arrested as of 17 could potentially include
many youth who have virtually no chance of committing a serious crime. Indeed, this law-abiding
population may well be at a “corner solution”, whereby ua > ucr > us. We would not expect to
see any impact of more punitive sanctions for this sub-population.
Second, it is plausible that those who have already been arrested by age 17 are more likely to
understand that there is a diﬀerence between the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems; they
may even have been warned about this fact upon their initial arrest. Glassner et al. (1983) provide
anecdotal evidence to support this.19
Third, our sample is not likely to be aﬀected by expungement or sealing of criminal records. In
Florida, as in most states, it is possible to have criminal records sealed or expunged. If juvenile
records were systematically missing relative to adult records, then we would be biased against
ﬁnding a deterrence eﬀect. As we demonstrate empirically in Section IV, by selecting on having
at least one juvenile record, we focus on a subpopulation whose entire juvenile arrest record is
observed.
Overall, we believe our sample is reasonably representative of the population that is likely to
be aﬀected by the increase in sanctions. Table I reports some summary statistics for our main
estimation sample. We begin with 64,073 individuals who have been arrested at least once by their
17th birthday. As is common in criminal justice data sets, 80 to 90 percent of these arrestees
are male, and roughly 50 percent are non-white. The ﬁrst three columns present information on
the ﬁrst, second, and third arrest for these individuals. Age at ﬁrst arrest is about 15, and the
most common category of oﬀense is property crime, followed by violent crime. At second and third
arrests, oﬀenders are over 16 and 17 on average, respectively, and the oﬀense mix is similar, with
drug crimes becoming somewhat more prevalent. At all three arrest snapshots, individuals are
distributed evenly among small, medium, and large counties.20
Column (4) of Table I presents means for the ﬁrst arrest since 17, which is observed for slightly
19For example, responding to a question regarding how he knew that sanctions were more punitive after the age
of majority, one twelve-year-old interviewed by the authors who was earlier arrested for stealing from cars responded
that the police had told him so: “Police come in our school and a lot of stuﬀ, and I get caught and they tell [sic] me
that” (p. 220).
20We classiﬁed counties according to total arrests in the FDLE data. Medium counties are Franklin, Palm Beach,
Duval, Pinellas, Polk, Escambia, and Volusia. Large counties are Miami-Dade, Broward, and Orange. Remaining
counties are classiﬁed as small.
15less than half of our main estimation sample. The sex and gender composition of those observed at
their ﬁrst arrest since 17 is similar to those observed at their ﬁrst, second, and third arrests, as is
the county-size distribution. Oﬀenses are distributed somewhat more evenly among the four crime
types described. The ﬁnal column reports the same statistics for all arrests where the individual
was 17 or 18 years old at the time of arrest. From the means, it is apparent that our sample is
broadly representative of this larger arrest population.
IV. Results
Our main result is summarized by Figure IV, an empirical analogue to Figure I. Each open circle
in the ﬁgure represents the fraction of the population that is arrested for each week subsequent to
the 17th birthday. For example, the ﬁrst circle shows that about 0.005 of the sample are arrested
within a week of their 17th birthday. In the week of their 18th birthday almost 0.0025 are arrested.
These numbers are calculated as a proportion of the sample that has not yet been arrested; that
is, the top panel of Figure IV is an empirical hazard function for being arrested, starting at age
17. The solid line gives predicted probabilities of arrest, based on maximum likelihood estimates
of the logit in equation (2).21
The ﬁgure shows little indication of a systematic drop in arrest rates at the age of 18. The
arrest probability literally does fall between the week before and after the 18th birthday, but that
drop does not appear to be unusual, as compared to week-to-week diﬀerences ranging from age 17
to 19.
For comparison, the bottom panel of Figure IV plots the analogous weekly arrest probabilities
for those who were arrested at least once by age 19. We track the arrest records for individuals
in this “falsiﬁcation” sample for two years, from 19 to 21. At each point over this time span, the
oﬀenders face the same punishment schedule (i.e., that of the adult criminal justice system) leading
to arrest probabilities which are smooth in age, as expected. Empirically, the top and bottom
panels of the ﬁgure are remarkably similar.
Table II reports estimated discontinuities in arrest probabilities at 18, based on the logit model
of Equation (2). These estimates support the inference suggested by Figure IV: the drop in arrests
21Here, Xt is a cubic polynomial in t. These predictions correspond to estimation of the model in column (1) of
Table II.
16at 18 is small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant. The estimated discontinuity is roughly
-0.018, with a standard error of about 0.047. These estimates imply that we can statistically rule
out values of µ more negative than -0.111.22 These estimates are much smaller than the predictions
of our theoretical model—even with an annual discount factor of 0.1, our model predicts that µ
should be in the range of -0.8 to -1.54.23
The estimated discontinuity is robust to changes in speciﬁcation. Moving from left to right in
Table II, we control for an increasing number of factors. Column (1) gives our most parsimonious
model, controlling only for a juvenile/adult dummy and a cubic polynomial in age at current arrest;
column (8) gives our most complex model, adding controls for race, size of county in which the
baseline arrest24 occurred, oﬀense type of baseline arrest, and a quintic polynomial in age at baseline
arrest. In each column, the added controls are good predictors of the probability of arrest, but in
no case does including additional controls aﬀect the estimated discontinuity importantly.
Appendix Table III explores the sensitivity of the estimates to functional form. It reports the
estimated µ for diﬀerent orders of the polynomial, ranging from a linear to a quintic polynomial in
time and allowing for interactions of the polynomial with the juvenile/adult dummy. The models are
also tested against an unrestricted speciﬁcation, where the polynomial and the dummy are replaced
with a full set of week-dummies. Overall, the linear and quadratic speciﬁcations are apparently too
restrictive, and can be statistically rejected by a test against the unrestricted model. For richer
speciﬁcations, including ones that include a linear term interacted with juvenile/adult status, the
point estimates range from -0.065 to 0.029, with none of the estimates being statistically signiﬁcant.
A similar pattern is found when baseline covariates are included.
We interpret our results as showing a small behavioral response to more punitive criminal
sanctions. Given our standard errors, we cannot rule out small deterrence eﬀects, but our estimates
are precise enough to easily rule out the benchmark magnitudes predicted by annualized discount
factors of 0.95, 0.5, and even 0.1.
We now consider some important potential threats to our analysis and interpretation.
22Use of a one-sided test implies rejection of any µ more negative than -0.095.
23Below, we inﬂate our estimates to account for juvenile transfer.
24For those in our estimation sample, we refer to the ﬁrst pre-17 arrest as the “baseline arrest”.
17IV.A. Transfers of Juveniles to the Adult Criminal Court
The ﬁrst threat to the validity of our research design is the possibility of a lack of a discontinuity
in the “treatment”. That is, while all adults are handled by the criminal courts, and most minors are
handled by the juvenile courts, all states allow a juvenile oﬀender to be transferred to the criminal
courts to be tried as an adult. This is particularly of concern in Florida, where prosecutors have
discretion on whether to try a juvenile arrestee as an adult.
In principle, prosecutors could be more likely to request that the case be transferred to the
criminal justice system when the arrestee is almost 18. In the extreme case, all arrestees aged 17.8
or 17.9 could be transferred to the adult court, which would result in no discontinuous jump in the
punitiveness of criminal sanctions and hence no “treatment”.
Our data allow us to empirically rule out this possibility. The top panel of Figure V plots the
probability of being formally charged as an adult as a function of the age at the ﬁrst post-17 arrest.
Each open circle represents the number of individuals against whom a formal prosecution was ﬁled,
expressed as a fraction of those who were arrested in that particular week.25 There is a striking
upward discontinuity at the age of 18; apparently, those who are arrested just before their 18th
birthday have about a 0.2 probability of being formally prosecuted as an adult, while those arrested
just after their 18th brithday have a 0.6 to 0.7 probability. The latter probability is not 1, because
not all arrestees will have formal charges ﬁled against them.
The bottom panel of Figure V provides further evidence of a discontinuity in the treatment,
using a diﬀerent measure of punishment. It instead plots the probability that the arrestee is
eventually convicted and sentenced to either state prison or a county jail. Again, the ﬁgure shows
a ﬂat relationship between this measure of punitiveness and the age at arrest. There is a noticeable
jump at age 18, from about 0.03 to 0.17.
We quantify these discontinuities in Table III, which reports coeﬃcient estimates from diﬀerent
OLS regressions. Columns (1) through (5) simply regress the dummy variable for whether the indi-
vidual was prosecuted on the juvenile/adult status dummy, a cubic polynomial in age at arrest, the
same cubic polynomial interacted with the juvenile/adult dummy, and other covariates. Columns
(6) through (8) further include the age at the baseline arrest as additional controls. Across spec-
25Therefore, the sample for this ﬁgure is the same as that underlying the top panel of Figure III.
18iﬁcations, the discontinuity estimate of about 0.40 is relatively stable. Appendix Table IV is an
analogous table for the probability of being convicted as an adult and sentenced to prison or jail.
IV.B. Eﬀects by Sub-groups and Crime Types
Another potential threat to the research design is the possibility that oﬀenses committed by
juveniles and adults have diﬀerent likelihoods of being recorded in our data. For example, it is
possible that law enforcement may exercise discretion in formally arresting an individual, based on
age. In particular, if the probability of arresting an individual, conditional on the same oﬀense, is
substantially higher for an 18.1 year old than a 17.9 year old, then it is theoretically possible that
the small eﬀects we observe are a combination of a negative deterrence eﬀect and a positive and
oﬀsetting jump in the arrest probability, due to law enforcement discretion.
There are a number of reasons why believe this is probably not occurring in our data. First,
our analysis focuses on very serious crimes, where it seems unlikely that an oﬃcer would be willing
to release a suspect without an arrest, purely on the basis of the individual’s age. Index crimes
include murder, robbery, rape, assault, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft, and involve a
victim. We suspect that the pressure to capture a suspect is too great for oﬃcers to be willing
to release an individual suspected of committing an Index crime. By contrast, for relatively less
serious crimes such as misdemeanors, or victimless crimes such as drug possession, the selective
release of oﬀenders based on age is more plausible.
Second, our main estimation sample consists of individual who already have a recorded formal
arrest as of age 17, when we begin following their arrest experiences. Thus, it seems unlikely that
the law enforcement agency will exercise leniency in recording an arrest: as of age 17, it is too late
to do anything to keep the youth’s felony arrest record clean.
Third, our analysis focuses on arrests since 1994, the year of Florida’s Juvenile Justice Reform
Act (JJRA), which required that felonies committed by juveniles be forwarded to the state for
inclusion in the criminal history records maintained by the FDLE.26 The impact of this law on
26The implications of this Florida law was summarized by an attorney general opinion in 1995: “Under Florida
law, crime and police records regarding crime have been a matter of public record. With limited exceptions, however,
the identity of a juvenile who committed a crime has been protected. With the enactment of Chapter 94-209, Laws
of Florida, an omnibus juvenile justice reform measure, the Legislature has amended the conﬁdentiality provisions
relating to juvenile oﬀenders to allow for greater public dissemination of information. The clear goal of the Legislature
was to establish the public’s right to obtain information about persons who commit serious oﬀenses, regardless of
age” (Butterworth 1995, p. 274).
19the prevalence of juvenile records is shown in Appendix Figure I. This ﬁgure show the ratio of
arrests of 17-year-olds to 18-year-olds, by year and month, from 1989 to 2002. There is a marked
discontinuity in the ratio after October 1994, the eﬀective date of the JJRA.
Finally, if juvenile and adult arrests had diﬀerent likelihoods of being recorded in our data,
we would expect to observe signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the estimated µ, by diﬀerent groups of
individuals, and diﬀerent crime types, since it is likely that any oﬀ-setting measurement problems
will vary by characteristics of the individual, as well as by crime type. Figure VI provides evidence
contrary to this prediction. The top panel of the ﬁgure disaggregates the arrest probabilities from
the top panel of Figure IV into two components: property and violent crime. The ﬁgure shows
that the estimated discontinuity is essentially the same for the two categories of crime.
We also estimate µ separately by sub-groups deﬁned by key correlates of arrest propensities,
and ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant negative eﬀects for some groups being masked by positive eﬀects
of other sub-groups. Table IV reports estimates from interacting the juvenile/adult dummy with
race, size of county of the baseline arrest, and oﬀense of the baseline arrest. The estimates for these
diﬀerent sub-groups range from -0.07 to 0.09. These estimates are generally of small magnitude;
moreover, none of the 20 are statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the interaction eﬀects are equal to the main eﬀect presented in Table II, and this holds for all
speciﬁcations considered.
Although our analysis focuses on Index crimes, we show for completeness the results for all
remaining oﬀenses in the bottom panel of Figure VI. We consider the potential for arrest discretion
to be the most serious for these non-Index crimes, which include “victimless” oﬀenses such as drug
possession, or resisting arrest felonies, for example. Here, the cubic polynomial predictions do show
a small perverse discontinuity, although the simple means, represented by the squares and circles,
do not reveal an obviously compelling jump at age eighteen. Thus, the relative smoothness for these
arguably “worst-case” crime categories, as well as their similarity between the drug and non-drug
stratiﬁcation are also consistent with minimal arrest discretion at age eighteen.
IV.C. Expungement of Records
Here, we describe in greater detail how the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to circum-
vent problems caused by potential expungement and sealing of juvenile records. In general, the
20ability to expunge or seal one’s records could potentially generate a positive discontinuity in arrest
probabilities. That is, if we observe a much greater number of arrestees of age 18.1 compared to
17.9, this could be entirely due to some fraction of those of age 17.9 erasing their juvenile records,
which would therefore not be included in our database. More generally, this expungement eﬀect
could oﬀset any true negative deterrence eﬀect.
Florida law allows individuals who successfully complete a juvenile diversion program to apply
to have all juvenile records expunged (Fla. Stat. 943.0582). Apart from this provision, Florida law
also mandates that juvenile arrest histories be expunged when the individual turns 24.27
Our sample circumvents these two expungement provisions in the following way. First, our
estimation sample is restricted to those committing baseline crimes before age 17 but subsequent
to January 1, 1995. Therefore, the individuals are no older than 24 by the end of our sample
frame, and thus will not be subject to the time-activated expungement. Second, a requirement for
inclusion in our sample is an arrest record prior to age 17. These individuals therefore did not have
their complete juvenile arrest history expunged.
To illustrate how our sample avoids the expungement problem, we examine the time proﬁle
of arrests for the individuals who are not included in our sample. For this remainder sample of
individuals who were not observed as arrested prior to turning 17. Some of these individual’s
ﬁrst real arrest will occur before eighteen, and for some it will occur after eighteen. If there
is an opportunity for the former group to later expunge their juvenile records, then a positive
discontinuity in the number of arrests should occur at age eighteen.
This is the pattern found in Figure VII. This ﬁgure is a “stacked” histogram, where the combined
total represents the total number of people who are arrested for the ﬁrst time since turning 17. The
histogram is comprised of two populations, those arrests corresponding to our estimation sample
(the dark bars) and the remaining, unused observations (the light bars). For the total, there is
a striking positive discontinuity at age 18. But this discontinuity is entirely concentrated in the
unused sample (the upper part of the stacked graph).28
27The exception to this is when the individual has committed a serious oﬀense as an adult. “Habitual oﬀenders’”
juvenile records are retained by the FDLE until the oﬀender is 26, (Fla. Stat. 943.0585, 943.059).
28The dark bars represent the values used in the upper panel of Figure III, except that Figure III normalizes each
value with the “at-risk” population at each point in time to provide a probability value.
21IV.D. Evidence on Incapacitation
We have argued that expected incarceration length becomes discontinuously more punitive at
age 18. If this is correct, then subsequent to the arrest of two individuals—one just older than 18
and the other just younger than 18—we should expect to see the marginal adult oﬀender committing
fewer subsequent oﬀenses due to this diﬀerential incapacitation. The data are strongly consistent
with this prediction.
This is shown in Figure VIII. The top panel of the ﬁgure plots the average number of arrests that
occur after the initial arrest as a function of the age at the initial arrest. Speciﬁcally, the leftmost
open circle indicates that among those who are arrested the week after their 17th birthday, the
average number of times they are arrested within the subsequent 30 days is a little less than 0.20.
Among those arrested just before their 18th birthday, they are arrested approximately 0.20 times
within the subsequent 30 days.
There is a discontinuity at age 18, with 18.02 year olds being arrested half as many times
within the 30 day window. We believe the most plausible explanation for this diﬀerence is that
being handled by the adult courts leads to a longer period of custody than does being processed
as a juvenile. The 17.98 year old is released earlier and hence has a greater opportunity to commit
more crimes, compared to the 18.02 year old. There seems to be no other diﬀerences between
the 17.98 and 18.02 year-old arrestees. For example, soon after being initially arrested, the 17.98
year-old will turn 18, and from that point on both groups of individuals will be subject to the same
adult regime.
The solid circles and open triangles plot the same kind of graph, except that we examine the
number of arrests occurring within 120 and 365 days after the initial arrest. Since the number of
arrests is cumulative, the averages are necessarily higher. The discontinuity estimate also grows in
magnitude, but seems to level oﬀ at longer periods.
Note that the length of the follow-up period—30 days, 120 days, or 365 days—is arbitrary.
The bottom panel of Figure VII plots the proﬁle of discontinuity estimates using follow-up lengths
ranging from 1 to 365 days. For example, the estimates at 30, 120, and 365 days in the bottom
panel—emphasized with large solid triangles—correspond to the discontinuity estimates from the
top panel of the ﬁgure. Overall, the bottom panel shows that even after 20 days, there is a large
22divergence in the cumulative number of arrests between those who are arrested as a 17.98 year-old
and those arrested at age 18.02, for example. This divergence continues to grow, slowing down at
around 100 days after the initial arrest.
We interpret this as evidence that incapacitation eﬀects occur fairly rapidly after an arrest
occurs. This ﬁnding is important for two reasons. First, it provides a potential explanation for
why our magnitudes are so much smaller than those of, for example, Levitt (1996).29 It is possible
that the use of arrest data at relatively coarse intervals (age in years) could lead to estimates that
combine both deterrence and incapacitation eﬀects.
Second, Figure VIII constitutes further supporting evidence for our research design. Marginal
juveniles and marginal adults, while similar in age, do appear to be given very diﬀerent punishments,
with diﬀerences in incarceration lengths occurring in the very short run.
V. Alternative Interpretations
As shown in Section IV.A, 20 percent of the juvenile arrestees in our sample are prosecuted
as adults. This “noncompliance” means that our discontinuity estimates are “intent-to-treat”
parameters, and must be inﬂated in order to be comparable to our theoretical predictions. After
accounting for both noncompliance and sampling variation, we can rule out predicted values for µ
more negative than -0.14.30;31
This magnitude is signiﬁcantly smaller than is predicted by the theoretical model outlined in
Section II. For example, consider the µ of smallest magnitude that is consistent with our estimates
for SJ, SA, and Ep, and our choice of ±. As is apparent in Figure II, the magnitude of µ is smaller
when we choose SJ and Ep to be as large as possible. Based on Appendix Tables I and II, this
results in SJ = 7, SA = 21, and Ept0 = 0:5. Setting ± = 0:1 leads to a predicted µ of -0.66. Using
the estimate from column (1) of Table II, we reject at the 1 percent level the hypothesis that µ is
equal to this value.
29Levitt (2004b) notes that the range of estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to expected punishment is
roughly -0.10 to -0.40. Our theoretical predictions are comfortably within this range. A 200 percent increase in the
expected incarceration is predicted to lower arrest rates by 55-79 percent, leading to elasticity estimates of -0.275 to
-0.39.
30Juvenile transfer leads us to scale up our estimated discontinuity (standard error) of -0.018 (0.0474) by 1/0.8=1.25,
resulting in a point estimate (standard error) of -0.0225 (0.05925).
31Using a one-sided conﬁdence region, we can rule eﬀect sizes larger in magnitude than 12 percent.
23The unusually low discount factors implied by our calibration exercise suggest that it is worth-
while to consider a number of reasonable alternative interpretations of the estimated magnitudes.
V.A. Myopia and Hyperbolic Discounting
One possibility is that our assumption of exponential discounting is too restrictive. With ex-
ponential discounting, an increase in incarceration from 2 to 6 days represents a larger increase in
the relative “price” of crime, compared to an increase from 2 to 6 weeks, which in turn, represents
a larger relative price increase than a change from 2 to 6 years.
A natural alternative to consider is the case of hyperbolic discounting, where short-run discount
factors are smaller than long-run discount factors. Under hyperbolic discounting, a tripling of
incarceration lengths can potentially have a smaller proportional response in the short-run than in
the long run.
To illustrate this, we adopt quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where the discount sequence is given
by 1;¯±;¯±2;¯±3;::: with ¯ < 1. This sequence captures the qualitative aspect of diﬀerent discount
factors for the short-run and the long-run. In the psychology and economics literature, this form
of discounting is often used to model tastes for immediate gratiﬁcation and self-control problems.
Here, we consider the case of the so-called sophisticated hyperbolic discounter, who has correct
expectations about his own future preferences and actions. In Appendix A, we show that under
this scenario, (4) and (5) are modiﬁed only slightly to become
pt0¡1 =
ucr ¡ ua
ucr ¡ us + ¯ ±¡±SJ
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
pt0 =
ucr ¡ ua
ucr ¡ us + ¯ ±¡±SA
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
(7)
and the expression for (1 ¡ ±)V remains the same as in (6). Using these modiﬁed equations, we
can compute the predicted µ in the exactly same manner as described in Section II, except that we
must choose a value for ¯.
Figure IX illustrates the predicted µ that would result in response to a tripling of incarceration
lengths, for diﬀerent values of SJ, SA, and ±, while letting ¯ = 0:05. For comparison, the same
curves from the bottom panel of Figure II (representing the exponential case) are provided in the
ﬁgure. The open squares present predicted eﬀects under hyperbolic discounting, with ¯ = 0:05
24and ± = 0:999. These predictions show that for very short horizons—when SJ is 1 or 2 weeks—a
tripling of the incarceration length at age 18 leads to a µ that is smaller in magnitude than 0.20.
This is much smaller than the prediction under exponential discounting, which is about 0.80 in
magnitude.
For the hyperbolic agent, the predicted µ grows in absolute value as we examine longer time
horizons, as intuition would suggest: in the very short run, when discount factors are very low,
additional periods of incarceration seem less costly, but in the longer run, when discount factors are
higher, those additional periods of punishment become more important. Note that the predicted µ
asymptotes to zero in the long run.
The open circles and triangles illustrate the predicted µ for the case of ¯ = 0:05;± = 0:987
(annual discount factor of 0.5) and for the case ¯ = 0:05;± = 0:957 (annual discount factor of 0.1).
These two curves show a similar pattern. For very short time horizons, µ is relatively small in
magnitude. It becomes more negative for longer horizons, and asymptotes toward the curves for
the exponential case.
In summary, the average incarceration length for juveniles ranges between 2.6 and 6.4 weeks,
and it is precisely within this time horizon that the exponential model has a diﬃcult time explaining
small discontinuity estimates. On the other hand, a certain degree of myopia, which allows short-
run discount factors to be smaller than long-run discount factors, can explain small eﬀects in short
time horizons.
V.B. Inframarginal Criminals
Another potential explanation for our results is that our sample of oﬀenders are “inframarginal”
in the sense that large changes in the price of crime do not aﬀect criminal behavior because the
beneﬁts of crime far exceed the costs. That is, in the discussion above, we conjecture that criminal
oﬀending does not respond signiﬁcantly to increased incarceration lengths because the eﬀective
price of crime does not change signiﬁcantly—due to the degree and form of the discounting. Alter-
natively, the price may be changing signiﬁcantly, but so few crimes are prevented that the decline
is imperceptible.
Figure X illustrates the point. It plots a hypothetical density for p. In the ﬁgure, most of the
mass of the density is on the left side of the support, implying that most criminal opportunities
25carry a small risk of apprehension. Thus far, we have emphasized that impatience and myopia
could lead the cutoﬀ p, to be highly inelastic, in which case an an increase in incarceration lengths
could result in the small shift of p from line A to line B, for example.
But an alternative possibility is that oﬀenders are reasonably patient and not myopic, and that
an increase in incarceration lengths lead the cutoﬀ p to fall signiﬁcantly—but from line C to line
D. Since the density is low in that region, oﬀense rates would not change signiﬁcantly under such a
scenario. In other words, only a small fraction of criminal opportunities are aﬀected by the change
in the cutoﬀ p.
It should be noted, however, that a natural consequence of this alternative hypothesis is that
the elasticity of criminal behavior with respect to law enforcement must be small. Intuitively, if
most opportunities’ beneﬁts far exceed their costs, increases in the probability of punishment will
only slightly aﬀect oﬀending rates. In the graph, increasing police will tend to shift the density
of p to the right. This means that the “inframarginal criminal” hypothesis also implies very small
marginal eﬀects of police.
Thus, we cannot completely rule out the “inframarginal criminal” hypothesis, but we view it
as unsatisfactory. The empirical literature on policing is well-developed, and most studies ﬁnd
large elasticities of crime with respect to policing levels (Levitt 2004a). For example, Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2004) estimate an elasticity of crime with respect to police of roughly -0.3. In sum, if
the population that we study is sensitive to the likelihood of punishment, then it must also be true
that there is a nontrivial number of criminal opportunities “on the margin” of being worthwhile.
V.C. Irrational or Uninformed Criminals
Finally, the theory that we utilize presumes that potential oﬀenders are rational, and have
correct expectations about the consequences of their behavior. This may simply be untrue. As an
example, our empirical analysis shows quite clearly that the probability of being formally prosecuted
as an adult rises discontinuously at age 18 (see Figure V). But it may well be that young oﬀenders
are unaware of this fact. They may be unaware that the average incarceration length for adults is at
least 3 times the length for juveniles, and they may be unaware that being caught as an adult rather
than as a juvenile implies an immediate diﬀerence in the length of incapacitation (as suggested by
Figure VIII). Young oﬀenders may not only be unaware of the actual probabilities of arrest, but
26also unaware that juveniles and adults are treated diﬀerently by the criminal justice system. These
are all examples of how young oﬀenders could be making systematic errors in estimation. Each of
these possibilities could independently explain why the estimates µ could be so small.32
VI. Policy Implications
We view our results as inconsistent with the hypothesis that transferring juveniles to the adult
court or lowering the criminal age of majority will reduce crime through deterrence. The evi-
dence does suggest, however, that such policies could lead to a reduction in the incidence of crime
through incapacitation. Prison expansion may be desirable, particularly if the crimes prevented by
incarceration have a high social cost. On the other hand, the general equilibrium eﬀects described
by Freeman (1999) may oﬀset these beneﬁts: even as locked-up criminals are prevented from re-
cidivating, in a long-run equilibrium, previously “crowded-out” criminals may simply take their
place.
We also conclude—albeit more tentatively—that increasing the frequency of jail or prison sen-
tences or otherwise lengthening periods of incarceration has limited value as a deterrent. Strictly
speaking, our discontinuity estimate measures an evolutionary response to an anticipated change
in the price of crime at a given point in time, while uniform increases in incarceration lengths
represent an increase in price of crime along all points in the life cycle. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the two eﬀects are connected. Speciﬁcally, in our model, the former is strictly greater in
magnitude than the latter. This is because an anticipated change in punitiveness will raise the total
punishment exclusively through the length of incarceration, while a uniform increase throughout
the lifecycle will additionally make crime generally less attractive and hence reduce the per-period
opportunity cost of being incarcerated.33
A caveat to this conclusion involves the case of hyperbolic discounting. If potential oﬀenders
have very high short-run discount rates but low long-run discount rates, then in principle, there
32On the other hand, as Levitt (1998) suggests, there is reason to believe that young oﬀenders are, at a minimum,
aware that it is better to be arrested as a juvenile than as an adult for the same crime.
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. The latter is smaller
in magnitude than the former because V
¤, the new discounted expected utility of being free, is larger than V (since
incarceration lengths have fallen).
27can be large marginal eﬀects for the sub-population who are to face long prison sentences. On the
other hand, our estimates indicate that this sub-population may be relatively small—at least too
small to aﬀect the overall estimates for our main sample.
Finally, we note that our ﬁndings may indicate that the marginal criminal justice dollar is more
eﬀectively spent on raising the probability of imprisonment rather than the incarceration length.
Even with highly impatient or myopic criminals, doubling the odds of punishment will double the
eﬀective price of crime.
VII. Conclusions
A longstanding notion in the economics of crime is that illegal behavior can be deterred by
raising either the certainty or severity of punishment. In practice, this tradeoﬀ is highly dependent
on criminals’ discount rates. This is because the only practical way to increase severity is to lengthen
periods of incarceration, which will only raise the price of crime if discount rates are relatively low.
If discount rates are very high, then incarceration can do little to deter illegal behavior. By contrast,
elasticities with respect to the likelihood of incarceration are invariant to discount rates.
Learning about discount rates requires a setting that generates exogenous variation in the timing
of future payoﬀs. We believe that our research design generates such exogenous variation. Upon
turning 18, an individual faces an immediate increase in the length of incarceration. In addition,
all other determinants of criminal behavior are arguably stable from one week before to one week
after the 18th birthday.
Using this approach, we ﬁnd that criminals are largely unresponsive to this sharp change in
future penalties. We attempt to rationalize the magnitudes with a simple expected utility model
with exponential discounting. We ﬁnd this model to be unappealing for two reasons. First, to
accommodate the data, the model requires extremely small discount factors, e.g., lower than 0.1.
Second, the exponential model predicts the largest elasticities for the incarcerations at the shortest
horizons—an increase in incarceration length from 1 to 3 days is predicted to have much larger
proportional eﬀects than an increase in incarceration length from 1 to 3 years.
Thus, we favor a less restrictive form of time preferences: that of hyperbolic discounting. A
model of myopia with reasonable long-run discount rates predicts an inverted U-shape for elasticity
sizes. Elasticities are small in the very short-term (e.g., days), larger in the medium-term (e.g.,
28weeks/months), and small again in the very long-term (e.g., years). Such a model also seems
intuitive, as criminal behavior—at least for the kinds of crimes that we focus on—could be thought
of as the consequence of a self-control problem and a taste for immediate gratiﬁcation.
29A. Theory Appendix
In this Appendix, we describe in detail how we obtain Equations (4), (5), (6), and (7), which
we use for providing our predicted magnitudes of µ. We ﬁrst describe the case of exponential
discounting, and then the case of “sophisticated” hyperbolic agents.
1. Exponential Discounting
The model is similar to a search model of unemployment, in which each period the individual
obtains a draw from a distribution of wage oﬀers. In our context, at the beginning of any period
t, the individual draws from a distribution of criminal opportunities, indexed by pt. Let F¤ (¢) be
the cumulative distribution function of pt. The individual then chooses whether or not to commit
the crime. With probability pt, he is arrested and is incarcerated for a ﬁxed number of periods: if
caught as a juvenile t < t0, SJ periods, if caught as an adult t ¸ t0, he faces SA (> SJ) periods of
incarceration. During this period of incarceration, he cannot commit crime, and upon release, he
is free again to commit crime.
In each period, he receives ﬂow utility ucr if he commits the crime undetected, us if he is caught
in the act or is serving an period of incarceration, and ua if he abstains from crime. In each period,







where ± is the constant discount factor, Et is an expectation given information at the beginning of
period t, and u¿ is a random variable that equals either ucr, us, or ua, depending on the random
draw of pt, the agent’s plan, and whether the agent is apprehended. The individual maximizes over
all feasible plans, so his choice consists of a sequence of decisions to commit or abstain, conditional
on draws of pt.
We solve recursively, ﬁrst beginning with the adult’s (t ¸ t0) problem. Upon observing the
draw pt, the individual has two choices:
1. Commit the crime: obtain the utility (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ±V )+pt
¡
us + ±us + ¢¢¢ + ±SA¡1us + ±SAV
¢
,
or equivalently, (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ±V ) + pt
³
us + ±¡±SA
1¡± us + ±SAV
´
.
2. Abstain from crime: obtain the utility ua + ±V




, evaluated at the optimal plan. The agent
commits the crime if and only if (1¡pt)(ucr+±V )+pt(us+ ±¡±SA
1¡± us+±SAV ) > ua+±V . Equivalently,
he will commit the crime if and only if pt < pt, where
pt =
ucr ¡ ua
ucr ¡ us + ±¡±SA
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
which is the expression given in (5).





















1¡± us + ±SAV
o
+ F¤(p)(1 ¡ Ep)fucr + ±V g + (1 ¡ F¤(p))fua + ±V g
30where Ep ´ E[ptjpt · p]. Re-arranging, we obtain
(1 ¡ ±)V =
1¡±SA
1¡± F¤ (p)Epus + F¤ (p)(1 ¡ Ep)ucr + (1 ¡ F¤ (p))ua
1 + ±¡±SA
1¡± F¤ (p)Ep
which is the expression given by (6). Note that (1 ¡ ±)V can be viewed as the “annuitized” value
of the problem (whenever the individual is free to commit a crime), and is a weighted average of
the three ﬂow utilities, where the weights depend on F¤ (p), Ep, ±, and SA.
Now consider the individual at time t = t0 ¡ 1, the period immediately preceding his 18th
birthday. His two choices are
1. Commit crime: obtain utility (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ±V ) + pt
¡
us + ±us + ¢¢¢ + ±SJ¡1us + ±SJV
¢
, or
equivalently, (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ±V ) + pt
³
us + ±¡±SJ
1¡± us + ±SJV
´
.
2. Abstain from crime: obtain utility ua + ±V
The only diﬀerence here is that SA has been replaced by the shorter incarceration length SJ.
V is exactly the same as before because at time t0 ¡1, the individual becomes an adult in the next
period and faces the adult (stationary) dynamic problem. This leads to
pt0¡1 =
ucr ¡ ua
ucr ¡ us + ±¡±SJ
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
which is the expression in (4).
2. Hyperbolic Discounting
Now consider the problem with the quasi-hyperbolic discount sequence given by 1;¯±;¯±2;¯±3 :::
The solution has a similar form to that of the exponential case, with two diﬀerences: (1) the solution
includes the short run discount factor ¯, and (2) V has a slightly diﬀerent interpretation.








Since preferences are now time-inconsistent, we need to make an additional assumption about the
agent’s beliefs about his preferences in the future (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). We consider the
case of sophistication, where the individual is aware of his present-biased preferences, and of the
future choices he will make due to those preferences. Consider the adult’s (stationary) problem
ﬁrst. His two choices are
1. Commit crime: obtain utility (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ¯±V )+pt
¡
us + ¯±us + ¢¢¢ + ¯±SA¡1us + ¯±SAV
¢
,
or equivalently, (1 ¡ pt)(ucr + ¯±V ) + pt
³
us + ¯ ±¡±SA
1¡± us + ¯±SAV
´
.
2. Abstain from crime: obtain utility ua + ¯±V
which is similar to before, except that V has a diﬀerent deﬁnition.




, evaluated at the optimal contingent plan. Note the change in
where the index ¿ starts. With this deﬁnition, ¯±V gives the sophisticated agent’s evaluation—from
the perspective of period t—of all periods starting at t + 1.





ucr ¡ us + ¯ ±¡±SA
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)





ucr ¡ us + ¯ ±¡±SJ
1¡± ((1 ¡ ±)V ¡ us)
which are given in (7). The superscript sp denotes the solution for a sophisticated hyperbolic agent.
Even though V here has a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition, the expression for it is identical to (6).














(1 ¡ ±)V =
1¡±SA
1¡± F¤ (psp)Epspus + F¤ (psp)(1 ¡ Epsp)ucr + (1 ¡ F¤ (psp))ua
1 + ±¡±SA
1¡± F¤ (psp)Epsp
Although V has the same form as in the exponential case, its actual value will be diﬀerent, because
it is evaluated at the steady-state threshold psp rather than at p.
In general, holding all else equal—including keeping ± constant—a lower ¯ leads to higher levels
of crime, for two reasons. First, the discounted cost is lower, due to ¯ < 1. Second, the expected
opportunity cost of incarceration, given by (1 ¡ ±)V ¡us, will be smaller for the hyperbolic agent.
This is because the sophisticated hyperbolic correctly knows that he has a self-control problem and
will commit “too much” crime in the future. More formally, we know that p—the threshold for the
exponential case—maximizes V . Therefore, any other threshold psp must make V smaller.
B. Details on Selected Calculations
In this Appendix, we describe how we obtain rough estimates of (1) the average length of
incarceration conditional on an arrest for both juveniles (SJ) and adults (SA), and (2) the expected
probability of arrest Ep = E [pjp < p]. These quantities are used in our computation of predicted
magnitudes of µ in Section II.
1. Average Incarceration Lengths: SJand SA
To estimate the average number of weeks that an arrestee can expect to spend incarcerated, we
obtain the cumulative number of person-weeks that are spent incarcerated for a given year, and
divide by the total number of arrests that occur within the year. As long as jail/prison populations
and arrest numbers are reasonably stable, this should provide the average number of weeks spent
incarcerated per arrest.
In the juvenile courts, a serious criminal oﬀender will be placed in secure “detention” (the
rough equivalent of jail), where they await an adjudication by the juvenile court judge. If they are
found to be guilty, they are committed to a residential placement facility (the rough equivalent of
a prison). In the table, column (2) (labeled “jail”) includes juveniles in secure detention awaiting
an adjudication as well as adults who are unconvicted, but awaiting court proceedings. Note that
in the United States, jails not only incarcerate those awaiting hearings and trials, but also those
who have been convicted to short prison terms. Therefore, the prison population includes adults
in a state correctional facility as well as those incarcerated in jail who are serving a sentence. For
juveniles, the prison population (column (3)) includes those in juvenile residential placement.
Our estimates of the jail and prison populations are complied from the 1999 Census of Jails,
the 2000 Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, and the 1999 Census of Juveniles in
32Residential Placement. Our estimates of the number of arrests come from the 1999 FBI Uniform
Crime Reports.
The ﬁrst two numbers in column (1) of Appendix Table I provide the number of arrests for
juveniles (younger than 18 years old) and adults (18 and older). Column (2) provides the stock of
juveniles and adults incarcerated in jail awaiting court proceedings. Provided that these population
numbers are reasonable estimates of the average daily population throughout the year, this number
multiplied by 52 gives the number of person-weeks spent incarcerated in “jail” throughout the year.
The next column takes the ratio of the ﬁrst two columns to produce an average duration of
incarceration conditional on an arrest. For juveniles, it is about 0.59 weeks, and for adults it is
about 2.21 weeks. The ratio of these is given in the same column (3.77).
Column (3) provides prison populations for both juveniles and adults, and the subsequent
column divides by the number of arrests to give the average length of incarceration in juvenile or
adult prison—2.06 and 6.09—conditional on an arrest. It is important to note that this average
will include many zeroes, for those who are not convicted/committed, or for whom formal charges
are dropped. The ﬁnal column adds the two averages. Overall, the expected length of incarceration
conditional on an arrest is about 2.65 weeks for a juvenile, and 8.30 for adults.
Our analysis focuses on Index crimes. More minor crimes are likely to lead to very short
periods of custody, and many oﬀenders—particularly for misdemeanors—may be released almost
immediately after a formal arrest. Thus, the numbers in the ﬁrst set of rows are probably a lower
bound on the incarceration lengths, conditional on an Index arrest.
To obtain an upper bound, the second set of rows re-computes the average durations using the
number of Index Crime arrests as the denominator. This is an upper bound since surely some non-
Index Arrests lead to a positive incarceration length. Overall, these show a much larger average
duration for adults, with the estimated ratio SA=SJ as large as 8.86 for the average duration in jail.
Among the six ratios reported in the upper part of the table, it appears that a ratio of SA=SJ = 3
is probably a conservative estimate of the relative punitiveness of adult criminal sanctions, in terms
of incarceration lengths. For comparison, we perform the same computation for the United States
as a whole. The bottom part of the table shows that the corresponding estimates of SA=SJ are of
a similar magnitude.
2. Expected Apprehension Rates (Conditional on Crime): E [pjp < p]
E [pjp < p] is the expected probability of being apprehended, conditional on committing a crime.
We provide a rough estimate of this quantity using so-called “clearance rates” from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reports. A reported crime is “cleared by arrest”, when an incident is followed up by law
enforcement, and results in arresting an alleged oﬀender.
Column (2) of Appendix Table II reports clearance rates for all FBI Index Crimes, and the
various sub-categories. The overall rate is 0.20. There are two reasons why this almost certainly
an upwardly biased estimate of E[pjp < p]. First, not all criminal incidents are reported to the
police, and therefore the denominator of Column (2) is probably too small. To address this, we
obtained estimates of the rate of reporting victimizations to the police from the National Criminal
Victimization Survey. By multiplying these rates (Column 3) by Column 2, we obtain an arguably
more accurate estimate of the probability of arrest conditional on committing an Index crime. The
average for all Index crimes is about 0.08, with the lowest for larceny (0.06), and the highest for
assault (0.26) and murder (0.49).
The second reason why both Column (2) and the ﬁnal column should be considered an upper
bound for E[pjp < p] is that it may well be true that some of the arrestees are mistakenly arrested;
that is, the numerator of both Column (2) and the ﬁnal column may be too large.
33For this reason, we believe that the estimates in ﬁnal column are probably still too large.
Nevertheless—since a larger estimate of E[pjp < p] will lead to larger absolute magnitudes of µ, we
use the values 0.10 and 0.25 to generate conservative predictions for µ.
C. Data Appendix
Our data set is constructed using four electronic ﬁles maintained by the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The FDLE refers to these ﬁles as the arrest, date of birth, judicial,
and identiﬁer ﬁles. They constitute the key elements of Florida’s Computerized Criminal History
(CCH) system, which is maintained by the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) division of
the FDLE. We obtained from the FDLE records on all felony arrests for the period 1989 to 2002.
1. Construction of Data Set
We construct our data set as follows. First, we begin with the arrests ﬁle, which contains a
person identiﬁer 34, the oﬀense date, the arrest date, the charge code, and the arresting agency.
Each record of the arrest ﬁle pertains to a separate oﬀense. 35 The total number of records
in the arrest ﬁle we received is 4,498,139. Because a single arrest event may result in multiple
records (due to multiple oﬀenses), we collapse the data down to the level of the (1) person identiﬁer
and (2) arrest date, coding the oﬀense as the most serious oﬀense with which the individual was
charged on that date. 36 There are 3,314,851 unique arrest-person observations.37 Our collapsing
procedure is essentially the “Hierarchy Rule” instituted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system for crime counting purposes (Federal Bureau
of Investigation 2004, p. 10).
We similarly collapse the judicial ﬁle down to the person-arrest-date level. The judicial ﬁle
represents all arrests that result in a formal prosecution. For each collapsed observation, if any
of the potentially multiple arrests led to a conviction and prison or jail sentence, a prison or jail
sentence was associated with the person-arrest-date. The collapsed judicial and arrest ﬁles were
then merged on the unique person-identiﬁer-arrest-date pair. Then, using the person identiﬁer,
which is present in all four ﬁles, race from the identiﬁer ﬁle was merged on, and birthday was
merged on from the birth date ﬁle.
2. Date Variables
The key variables we utilize from the arrest ﬁle are the person identiﬁer, the arrest date, and
the oﬀense code. The oﬀense date is missing for many observations, so we use the arrest date to
proxy for the date of crime commission. This is due primarily to a reporting problem—oﬃcers do
not always submit information on the oﬀense date. On the other hand, there are no missing values
for the arrest date. Among the 1,948,096 records with information on oﬀense date, every one of
those records has an associated arrest date. 90% of those arrest dates are equal to the oﬀense date,
34This person identiﬁer is constant across the various FDLE ﬁles.
35Roughly speaking, a record of the arrest ﬁle corresponds to the triple of (1) person identiﬁer, (2) arrest date,
and (3) charge code. Conceptually, the named triple will not uniquely identify a record due to the possibility of
multiple arrest events for the same crime on the same day. Practically, there also appear to be some minor errors
with double-counting in the ﬁle (e.g., two such triples, one with a missing oﬀense date and another with an oﬀense
date equal, as usual, to the arrest date). However, the number of unique triples in the data is 94.3% of the total record
count. We conclude that neither the conceptual distinction nor the double-counting issue is important empirically.
36We deﬁned the seriousness of an oﬀense according to...
37Thus, the average arrest event is associated with 1.36 charges.
34and over 93% of those arrest dates occur within the ﬁrst week subsequent to the stated oﬀense
date.
To further assess the validity of date of arrest as a proxy for date of oﬀense, we obtained
data from the Miami Police Department, which recorded arrest and oﬀense dates for all charges
pertaining to arrests made between July 1999 and December 2002. For the 272,494 arrests we
obtained, 257,263 have a valid oﬀense date, and 91.3% of those have oﬀense and arrest dates that
are identical, and with 95.8% of arrests occurring within the ﬁrst week after the oﬀense date.
Focusing only on felony arrests, we ﬁnd that of the 33,698 felony arrests, 32,033 have valid oﬀense
dates, and of these 78.9% have identical arrest and oﬀense dates, and 90.6% have associated arrest
dates that fall within a week of the oﬀense date.
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38Figure I. Criminal Propensity by Age:  
Theoretical Predictions 
 























 Figure II. Predicted Response to Tripling of Incarceration Length 
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 Figure III. Distribution of Age at Arrest: 
2002 Public-Use Data 
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Note: In top panel, “Arrested for Any Crime” = arrested for “Group A” NIBRS offense.  In 
UCR data, some age ranges are aggregated by the FBI. Figure IV. Criminal Propensity Estimates by Age 




























































































Note: Top (bottom) panel shows probability of first arrest since 17 (19), by age in weeks, for 
those arrested at least once prior to 17 (19). Figure V. Transfer and Punitiveness by Age 



























































































































































































Property Crime (right axis)



















































































































Non-Drug Crime (right axis)
Drug Crime (left axis)
 
Note: Top panel disaggregates estimates from top panel of Figure IV.  Bottom panel presents 
estimates for non-index crimes. Figure VII. Number of Arrests by Age: 

























Main Sample Unused Observations
 
Note: Figure is a stacked histogram (shaded and light rectangles sum to total).   Figure VIII. Incapacitation Effects 
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Note: Initial arrest = first arrest since 17. Top panel gives average number of arrests after 
initial arrest, by age in weeks, for three different follow-up lengths.  Bottom panel plots 
estimated discontinuity in number of follow-up arrests, for follow-up lengths ranging from 1 
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β = 0.05, δ = 0.999 (0.95 annualized)
β = 0.05, δ = 0.987 (0.5 annualized)
β = 0.05, δ = 0.957 (0.1 annualized)
 
Note: Each scenario assumes  0.5 t p = . Predictions under exponential discounting from 
Figure II shown as thin solid, dotted, and thick solid lines.  
 Figure X. Hypothetical Density of Criminal Opportunities: 















 Table I. Summary Statistics, Estimation Sample









Since 17 All Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-white 0.42 0.49 0.55  0.52  0.48 
Male 0.80 0.86 0.89  0.88  0.88 
Age 14.93 16.64 17.47  18.39  18.14 
(1.39) (1.97) (2.06) (1.24) (0.56)
Arrested in Small County 0.28 0.30 0.31  0.31  0.31 
Arrested in Medium County 0.36 0.36 0.36  0.35  0.35 
Arrested in Large County 0.36 0.34 0.33  0.34  0.34 
Index Crime, Violent 0.26 0.25 0.25  0.25  0.24 
Index Crime, Property 0.51 0.42 0.37  0.33  0.39 
Non-index Crime, Drug 0.07  0.15  0.18  0.22  0.20 
Non-index Crime, Non-drug 0.15  0.18  0.20  0.19  0.17 
Number of Persons 64,073 40,520 28,703 30,938 163,037
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Young arrestees are those arrested between 17 and 19. Number of arrests
observed for young arrestees is 247,037.Table II. Discontinuity Estimates of Deterrence
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimated Discontinuity -0.0180 -0.0172 -0.0170 -0.0176 -0.0174 -0.0174 -0.0172 -0.0171 
(0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0474)
Non-white 0.5448 0.5028 0.5758 0.5334 0.5425 0.5405 0.5405 
(0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176)
Size of County of Baseline Arrest
(Relative to Large County)
Small 0.2501  0.2553 0.2468 0.2498 0.2503 
(0.0214) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0215)
Medium 0.0813  0.0875 0.0869 0.0860 0.0863 
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0209)
Type of Crime, Baseline Arrest
(Relative to Non-index Non-Drug)
Index Crime, Violent 0.0195 0.0087 0.0159 0.0159 0.0162 
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0283)
Index Crime, Property 0.1914 0.1896 0.2017 0.2048 0.2046 
(0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256)
Non-index Drug -0.1525 -0.1541 -0.2072 -0.2134 -0.2132 
(0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0421)
Controls for Age at 
Baseline Arrest?     N    N    N    N     N    Y    Y    Y
Order of Polynomial in
Age at Baseline Arrest    1    3    5
Log-likelihood -96,005.7 -95,491.1 -95,420.3 -95,411.8 -95,338.8 -95,236.6 -95,178.3 -95,174.8
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Table presents coefficients from a logit model for being arrested for an index crime since 17. In addition to controls
described, each model controls for a cubic polynomial in age at current arrest, relative to 18. Estimates are based on a panel of 4,928,226 observations
pertaining to 64,703 persons.Table III. Discontinuity in Probability of Being Charged in Adult Court
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimated  Discontinuity 0.4042 0.4035 0.4041 0.4037    0.4043 0.4051 0.4052 0.4054 
(0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235)  (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0235)
Log  Discontinuity 1.1056 1.1044 1.1054 1.1048 1.1058 1.1070 1.1073 1.1075 
Non-white -0.0274 -0.0294 -0.0300    -0.0320 -0.0294 -0.0296 -0.0295 
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058)  (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Size of County of Baseline Arrest
(Relative to Large County)
Small 0.0141    0.0140 0.0129 0.0128 0.0129 
(0.0072)  (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0072)
Medium 0.0199    0.0198 0.0195 0.0194 0.0195 
(0.0069)  (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
Type of Crime, Baseline Arrest
(Relative to Non-index Non-Drug)
Index  Crime,  Violent 0.0055    0.0052 0.0060 0.0060 0.0060 
(0.0095)  (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Index Crime, Property -0.0031    -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0018 
(0.0085)  (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085)
Non-index Drug 0.0228    0.0229 0.0131 0.0127 0.0127 
(0.0120)  (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Controls for Age at 
Baseline Arrest?     N    N    N    N     N    Y    Y    Y
Order of Polynomial in
Age at Baseline Arrest    1    3    5
R
2 0.2144    0.2152    0.2155    0.2154    0.2157    0.2173    0.2174    0.2174
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Log discontinuity is difference in log probabilities and is calculated from the presented difference estimate using a 
baseline rate of 0.2 for the marginal juvenile.  Delta method standard errors for the log discontinuity are in each instance approximately 0.039.  Table IV. Heterogeneity in Discontinuity Estimates
Subsample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Arrestees -0.0180  -0.0171 
(0.0474) (0.0474)
White Arrestees 0.0240  0.0240 
(0.0670) (0.0670)
Non-white Arrestees -0.0592  -0.0590 
(0.0670) (0.0670)
Baseline Crime was in 0.0292 0.0300 
Large County (0.0821) (0.0821)
Baseline Crime was in -0.0214 -0.0208 
Medium County (0.0807) (0.0807)
Baseline Crime was in -0.0622 -0.0619 
Small County (0.0834) (0.0834)
Baseline Crime was 0.0553 0.0556 
Index, Violent (0.0930) (0.0930)
Baseline Crime was -0.0696 -0.0683 
Index, Property (0.0646) (0.0646)
Baseline Crime was 0.0919 0.0952 
Non-index, Drug (0.1960) (0.1959)
Baseline Crime was -0.0032 -0.0025 
Non-index, Non-drug (0.1250) (0.1250)
Log-likelihood -96,005.7 -95,174.8 -95,490.1 -95,173.8 -95,835.6 -95,170.6 -95,954.9 -95,165.0
Controls for Race?     N     Y    Y    Y    N    Y     N    Y
Controls for County 
Size?     N     Y    N    Y    Y    Y     N    Y
Controls for Baseline 
Crime Type?     N     Y    N    Y    N    Y     Y    Y
Controls for Age at 
Baseline Arrest?     N     Y    N    Y    N    Y     N    Y
Order of Polynomial in
Age at Baseline Arrest     5     5     5     5
Test for Equality of 
Discontinuity  Estimates 0.771 0.770 0.612 0.620 1.590 1.582 
degrees of freedom [ 1 ] [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 3 ]
p-value 0.380 0.380 0.736 0.733 0.662 0.663 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Table presents discontinuity estiamtes for different groups estimated from logit models.
Odd-numbered columns include only those controls appropriate to testing the treatment interaction of interest. For example,
column (3) includes controls for (i) white, (ii) a cubic polynomial in age, as in Table II, (iii) the interaction of the same cubic
polynomial with the indicator for white, (iv) the interaction of an indicator for being above 18 with the indicator for white
(estimate for whites shown), and (v) the interaction of the indicators for being above 18 and non-white (estimate for non-
whites shown). Even-numbered columns additionally include the richest set of controls considered in Table II. The final row





Duration Total Average Duration
A. Florida (1)     (2)    52*(2)/(1) (3)     52*(3)/(1) (2)+(3) 52*((2)+(3))/(1)
All Offenses as Denominator
Juvenile 131,330 1,482 0.59 5,211 2.06 6,693 2.65
Adult 766,259 32,585 2.21 89,730 6.09 122,315 8.30
Adult/Juvenile Ratio 3.77 2.95 3.13
Index Offenses as Denominator
Juvenile 53,967 1,482 1.43 5,211 5.02 6,693 6.45
Adult 133,853 32,585 12.66 89,730 34.86 122,315 47.52
Adult/Juvenile Ratio 8.86 6.94 7.37
B. United States
All Offenses as Denominator
Juvenile 1,588,839 26,439 0.87 76,926 2.52 103,365 3.38
Adult 7,552,362 354,379 2.44 1,546,456 10.65 1,900,835 13.09
Adult/Juvenile Ratio 2.82 4.23 3.87
Index Offenses as Denominator
Juvenile 420,543 26,439 3.27 76,926 9.51 103,365 12.78
Adult 1,091,530 354,379 16.88 1,546,456 73.67 1,900,835 90.55
Adult/Juvenile Ratio 5.16 7.75 7.09
Note: Table gives estimates of average incarceration length based on stock-flow comparisons. Adult and juvenile arrest counts are for the year 1999, from the
FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, as reported in the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Adult jail population counts come from the Census of Jails and
pertain to December 1999. Adult prison population counts come from the Census of Correctional facilities and pertain to June 2000. Juvenile jail and prison









Upper Bound for 
aaaaaaaa 
aaaaaaaa
(1)   (2)   (3)   (2)*(3)  
All Index Crimes 10,121,721 0.20 0.42 0.08
  Violent Crime 1,184,453 0.47 0.48 0.23
      Murder 13,561 0.64 0.77 * 0.49
      Forcible Rape 80,515 0.45 0.54 0.24
      Robbery 343,023 0.26 0.71 0.18
      Aggravated Assault 747,354 0.57 0.46 0.26
  Property Crime 8,937,268 0.17 0.40 0.07
      Burglary 1,842,930 0.13 0.58 0.08
      Larceny-Theft 6,014,290 0.18 0.33 0.06
      Motor Vehicle Theft 1,080,048 0.14 0.86 0.12




Note: Figures pertain to 2002 and are taken from the 30th Online Edition of the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics.
Figures labelled "UCR" are from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports system (Table 4.19). Figures labelled "NCVS" are
from the Census Bureau's National Crime Victimization Survey (Table 3.36). Asterisk indicates that the fraction of
victimizations reported to police was estimated by taking the ratio of offenses known to police to the number of 2002
murders reported to the National Center for Health Statistics (Table E, National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 17,
2005).  
[| ] tt t E pp p <Appendix Table III. Robustness of Main Results
Imposing Equality of Derivatives at 18 Allowing for Different Derivatives at 18
A. Unconditional Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimated Discontinuity 0.174 0.135  -0.018 0.002 0.029 0.147  -0.040 0.014  -0.054  -0.065 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057) (0.036) (0.053) (0.072) (0.090) (0.109)
Order of Polynomial 1   2   3   4   5   1   2   3   4   5  
Test  Against  Saturated  Model 175.8 144.2 119.8 113.8 113.0 153.5 119.5 112.6 110.3 109.3 
degrees of freedom [102] [101] [100] [99] [98] [101] [99] [97] [95] [93]
p-value 0.0000 0.0031 0.0865 0.1461 0.1421 0.0006 0.0789 0.1325 0.1351 0.1194
B. Controlling for Race, Size of County, and Type of Baseline Crime
Estimated  Discontinuity 0.173 0.134  -0.017 0.002 0.029 0.147  -0.039 0.014  -0.054  -0.065 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.047) (0.048) (0.057) (0.036) (0.053) (0.072) (0.090) (0.109)
Black 0.534 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.534 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.533 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Small County 0.256 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Medium County 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Baseline Crime Violent 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Baseline Crime Property 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Baseline Crime Non-index Drug -0.153 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 -0.154 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Order of Polynomial 1   2   3   4   5   1   2   3   4   5  
Test  Against  Saturated  Model 173.8 143.8 119.7 113.9 113.1 152.7 119.5 112.7 110.3 109.3 
degrees of freedom [102] [101] [100] [99] [98] [101] [99] [97] [95] [93]
p-value 0.0000 0.0033 0.0873 0.1455 0.1414 0.0007 0.0791 0.1323 0.1351 0.1192
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Table presents alternative parametrizations of the models given in Table II. Coefficients on the polynomial model are
suppressed throughout. In each panel the bottom row tests the fit of the presented model against a saturated model which includes a series of exhaustive and
mutually exclusive indicators for each possible age, in weeks.Appendix Table IV. Discontinuity in Probability of Adult Incarceration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Main Estimates
Estimated Discontinuity in Probability of Confinement 0.1475 0.1474 0.1459      0.1479 0.1464 0.1463 0.1459 0.1460 
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0154)    (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Log Discontinuity 1.7246 1.7238 1.7156 1.7264 1.7181 1.7176 1.7152 1.7162 
Non-white -0.0053 0.0012      -0.0043 0.0020 0.0017 0.0017 0.0018 
(0.0037) (0.0038)    (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Size of County of Baseline Arrest (Relative to Large)
Small -0.0476      -0.0472 -0.0471 -0.0469 -0.0468 
(0.0047)    (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Medium -0.0360      -0.0358 -0.0358 -0.0359 -0.0360 
(0.0045)    (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Type of Crime, Baseline Arrest (Relative to Non-index Non-drug)
Index Crime, Violent     -0.0156 -0.0142 -0.0143 -0.0143 -0.0143 
   (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Index Crime, Property     -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0040 
   (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Non-index Drug     0.0029 0.0033 0.0044 0.0039 0.0040 
   (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079)
Controls for Age at Baseline Arrest?    N    N    N     N    N    Y    Y    Y
Order of Polynomial in Age at Baseline Arrest    1    3    5
R
2 0.0649    0.0650    0.0695    0.0654    0.0699    0.0700    0.0702    0.0703
B. Decomposition of Probability of Incarceration into Prison and Jail:
Estimated Discontinuity in Probability of Prison 0.0401 0.0400 0.0394      0.0401 0.0395 0.0395 0.0392 0.0394 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)    (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Log Discontinuity 1.4066 1.4054 1.3943 1.4067 1.3954 1.3953 1.3907 1.3930 
Estimated Discontinuity in Probability of Jail 0.1075 0.1074 0.1065      0.1078 0.1069 0.1068 0.1066 0.1067 
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)    (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Log Discontinuity 1.9417 1.9410 1.9339 1.9442 1.9370 1.9364 1.9350 1.9353 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Log discontinuity calculated from presented discontinuity estimate using a baseline rate of 0.032 for the marginal juvenile. Delta-
method standard errors for the log discontinuity are in each case approximately 0.086. Bottom panel of table presents estimated discontinuity in probability of being
sentenced to adult prison and to adult jail, respectively. Log discontinuities in bottom panel use a baseline marginal juvenile rate for prison and jail of 0.013 and 0.018,
respectively. Delta-method standard errors for these log discontinuities are in each case approximately 0.15 and 0.086, respectively. Controls for regressions in bottom
panel suppressed.